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Abstract. Deep learning classifiers are known to be inherently vulner-
able to manipulation by intentionally perturbed inputs, named adver-
sarial examples. In this work, we establish that reinforcement learning
techniques based on Deep Q-Networks (DQNs) are also vulnerable to ad-
versarial input perturbations, and verify the transferability of adversarial
examples across different DQN models. Furthermore, we present a novel
class of attacks based on this vulnerability that enable policy manipu-
lation and induction in the learning process of DQNs. We propose an
attack mechanism that exploits the transferability of adversarial exam-
ples to implement policy induction attacks on DQNs, and demonstrate
its efficacy and impact through experimental study of a game-learning
scenario.
Keywords: Reinforcement Learning, Deep Q-Learning, Adversarial Ex-
amples, Policy Induction, Manipulation, Vulnerability
1 Introduction
Inspired by the psychological and neuroscientific models of natural learning, Re-
inforcement Learning (RL) techniques aim to optimize the actions of intelligent
agents in complex environments by learning effective controls and reactions that
maximize the long-term reward of agents. [1]. The applications of RL range from
combinatorial search problems such as learning to play games [2] to autonomous
navigation [3], multi-agent systems [4], and optimal control [5]. However, classic
RL techniques generally rely on hand-crafted representations of sensory input,
thus limiting their performance in the complex and high-dimensional real world
environments. To overcome this limitation, recent developments combine RL
techniques with the significant feature extraction and processing capabilities of
deep learning models in a framework known as Deep Q-Network (DQN) [6]. This
approach exploits deep neural networks for both feature selection and Q-function
approximation, hence enabling unprecedented performance in complex settings
such as learning efficient playing strategies from unlabeled video frames of Atari
games [7], robotic manipulation [8], and autonomous navigation of aerial [9] and
ground vehicles [10].
2 Vulnerability of Deep Reinforcement Learning to Policy Induction Attacks
The growing interest in the application of DQNs in critical systems necessi-
tate the investigation of this framework with regards to its resilience and robust-
ness to adversarial attacks on the integrity of reinforcement learning processes.
The reliance of RL on interactions with the environment gives rise to an inherent
vulnerability which makes the process of learning susceptible to perturbation as
a result of changes in the observable environment. Exploiting this vulnerabil-
ity provides adversaries with the means to disrupt or change control policies,
leading to unintended and potentially harmful actions. For instance, manipula-
tion of the obstacle avoidance and navigation policies learned by autonomous
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) enables the adversary to use such systems as
kinetic weapons by inducing actions that lead to intentional collisions.
In this paper, we study the efficacy and impact of policy induction attacks
on the Deep Q-Learning RL framework. To this end, we propose a novel attack
methodology based on adversarial example attacks against deep learning models
[13]. Through experimental results, we verify that similar to classifiers, Q net-
works are also vulnerable to adversarial examples, and confirm the transferability
of such examples between different models. We then evaluate the proposed attack
methodology on the original DQN architecture of Mnih, et. al. [7], the results
of which verify the feasibility of policy induction attacks by incurring minimal
perturbations in the environment or sensory inputs of an RL system. We also
discuss the insufficiency of defensive distillation [14] and adversarial training [15]
techniques as state of the art countermeasures proposed against adversarial ex-
ample attacks on deep learning classifiers, and present potential techniques to
mitigate the effect of policy induction attacks against DQNs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents an
overview of Q-Learning, Deep Q-Networks, and adversarial examples. Section 3
formalizes the problem and defines the target and attacker models. In Section 4,
we outline the attack methodology and algorithm, followed by the experimental
evaluation of the proposed methodology in Section 5. A high-level discussion on
effectiveness of the current countermeasures is presented in Section 6, and the
paper is concluded in Section 7 with remarks on future research directions.
2 Background
2.1 Q-Learning
The generic RL problem can be formally modeled as a Markov Decision Process,
described by the tupleMDP = (S,A, P,R), where S is the set of reachable states
in the process, A is the set of available actions, R is the mapping of transitions
to the immediate reward, and P represents the transition probabilities. At any
given time-step t, the MDP is at a state st ∈ S. The RL agent’s choice of action
at time t, at ∈ A causes a transition from st to a state st+1 according to the
transition probability P atst,st+a . The agent receives a reward rt = R(st, at) ∈ R
for choosing the action at at state st.
Interactions of the agent with MDP are captured in a policy π. When such
interactions are deterministic, the policy π : S → A is a mapping between the
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states and their corresponding actions. A stochastic policy π(s, a) represents the
probability of optimality for action a at state s.
The objective of RL is to find the optimal policy π∗ that maximizes the
cumulative reward over time at time t, denoted by the return function Rˆ =
∑t′=t
T γ
t′−trt′ , where γ < 1 is the discount factor representing the diminishing
worth of rewards obtained further in time, hence ensuring that Rˆ is bounded.
One approach to this problem is to estimate the optimal value of each action,
defined as the expected sum of future rewards when taking that action and
following the optimal policy thereafter. The value of an action a in a state s is
given by the action-value function Q defined as:
Q(s, a) = R(s, a) + γmaxa′(Q(s
′, a′)) (1)
Where s′ is the state that emerges as a result of action a, and a′ is a pos-
sible action in state s′. The optimal Q value given a policy pi is hence de-
fined as: Q∗(s, a) = maxpiQ
pi(s, a), and the optimal policy is given by π∗(s) =
argmaxaQ(s, a)
The Q-learning method estimates the optimal action policies by using the
Bellman equation Qi+1(s, a) = E[R + γmaxaQi] as the iterative update of a
value iteration technique. Practical implementation of Q-learning is commonly
based on function approximation of the parametrized Q-function Q(s, a; θ) ≈
Q∗(s, a). A common technique for approximating the parametrized non-linear
Q-function is to train a neural network whose weights correspond to θ. Such
neural networks, commonly referred to as Q-networks, are trained such that at
every iteration i, it minimizes the loss function
Li(θi) = Es,a∼ρ(.)[(yi −Q(s, a, ; θi))
2] (2)
where yi = E[R + γmaxa′ Q(s
′, a′; θi−1)|s, a], and ρ(s, a) is a probability
distribution over states s and actions a. This optimization problem is typically
solved using computationally efficient techniques such as Stochastic Gradient
Descent (SGD) [11].
2.2 Deep Q Networks
Classical Q-networks present a number of major disadvantages in the Q-learning
process. First, the sequential processing of consecutive observations breaks the iid
requirement of training data as successive samples are correlated. Furthermore,
slight changes to Q-values leads to rapid changes in the policy estimated by Q-
network, thus enabling policy oscillations. Also, since the scale of rewards and
Q-values are unknown, the gradients of Q-networks can be sufficiently large to
render the backpropagation process unstable.
A deep Q network (DQN) [6] is a multi-layered Q-network designed to miti-
gate such disadvantages. To overcome the issue of correlation between consecu-
tive observations, DQN employs a technique named experience replay: Instead of
training on successive observations, experience replay samples a random batch
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Fig. 1: DQN architecture for end-to-end learning of Atari 2600 game plays
of previous observations stored in the replay memory to train on. As a result,
the correlation between successive training samples is broken and the iid setting
is re-established. In order to avoid oscillations, DQN fixes the parameters of the
optimization target yi. These parameters are then updated at regulat intervals
by adopting the current weights of the Q-network. The issue of unstability in
backpropagation is also solved in DQN by clipping the reward values to the
range [−1,+1], thus preventing Q-values from becoming too large.
Mnih et. al. [7] demonstrate the application of this new Q-network technique
to end-to-end learning of Q values in playing Atari games based on observations
of pixel values in the game environtment. The neural network architecture of
this work is depicted in figure 1. To capture the movements in the game envi-
ronment, Mnih et. al. use stacks of 4 consecutive image frames as the input to
the network. To train the network, a random batch is sampled from the pre-
vious observation tuples (st, at, rt, st+1). Each observation is then processed by
2 layers of convolutional neural networks to learn the features of input images,
which are then employed by feed-forward layers to approximate the Q-function.
The target network Qˆ, with parameters θ−, is synchronized with the parameters
of the original Q network at fixed periods intervals. i.e., at every ith iteration,
θ−t = θt, and is kept fixed until the next synchronization. The target value for
optimization of DQN learning thus becomes:
y′t ≡ rt+1 + γmaxa′Qˆ(St+1, a
′; θ−) (3)
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Accordingly, the training process can be stated as:
minat(y
′
t −Q(st, at, θ))
2 (4)
2.3 Adversarial Examples
in [16], Szegedy et. al. report an intriguing discovery: several machine learning
models, including deep neural networks, are vulnerable to adversarial examples.
That is, these machine learning models misclassify inputs that are only slightly
different from correctly classified samples drawn from the data distribution. Fur-
thermore, a wide variety of models with different architectures trained on differ-
ent subsets of the training data misclassify the same adversarial example.
This suggests that adversarial examples expose fundamental blind spots in
machine learning algorithms. The issue can be stated as follows: Consider a
machine learning system M and a benign input sample C which is correctly
classified by the machine learning system, i.e. M(C) = ytrue. According to the
report of Szegedy [16] and many proceeding studies [13], it is possible to construct
an adversarial example A = C + δ, which is perceptually indistinguishable from
C, but is classified incorrectly, i.e. M(A) 6= ytrue.
Adversarial examples are misclassified far more often than examples that
have been perturbed by random noise, even if the magnitude of the noise is much
larger than the magnitude of the adversarial perturbation [17]. According to the
objective of adversaries, adversarial example attacks are generally classified into
the following two categories:
1. Misclassification attacks, which aim for generating examples that are classi-
fied incorrectly by the target network
2. Targeted attacks, whose goal is to generate samples that the target misclas-
sifies into an arbitrary class designated by the attacker.
To generate such adversarial examples, several algorithms have been pro-
posed, such as the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) by Goodfellow et. al.,
[17], and the Jacobian Saliency Map Algorithm (JSMA) approach by Papernot
et. al., [13]. A grounding assumption in many of the crafting algorithms is that
the attacker has complete knowledge of the target neural networks such as its
architecture, weights, and other hyperparameters. Recently, Papernot et. al. [18]
proposed the first black-box approach to generating adversarial examples. This
method exploits the generalized nature of adversarial examples: an adversarial
example generated for a neural network classifier applies to most other neural
network classifiers that perform the same classification task, regardless of their
architecture, parameters, and even the distribution of training data. Accordingly,
the approach of [18] is based on generating a replica of the target network. To
train this replica, the attacker creates and trains over a dataset from a mixture
of samples obtained by observing target’s performance, and synthetically gener-
ated inputs and label pairs. Once trained, any of the adversarial example crafting
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algorithms that require knowledge of the target network can be applied to the
replica. Due to the transferability of adversarial examples, the perturbed sam-
ples generated from the replica network will induce misclassifications in many
of the other networks that perform the same task. In the following sections,
we describe how a similar approach can be adopted in policy induction attacks
against DQNs.
3 Threat Model
We consider an attacker whose goal is to perturb the optimality of actions taken
by a DQN learner via inducing an arbitrary policy πadv on the target DQN. The
attacker is assumed to have minimal a priori information of the target, such
as the type and format of inputs to the DQN, as well as its reward function R
and an estimate for the frequency of updating the Qˆ network. It is noteworthy
that even if the target’s reward function is not known, it can be estimated via
Inverse Reinforcement Learning techniques [19]. No knowledge of the target’s
exact architecture is considered in this work, but the attacker can estimate this
architecture based on the conventions applied to the input type (e.g. image and
video input may indicate a convolutional neural network, speech and voice data
point towards a recurrent neural network, etc.).
In this model, the attacker has no direct influence on the target’s architecture
and parameters, including its reward function and the optimization mechanism.
The only parameter that the attacker can directly manipulate is the configu-
ration of the environment observed by the target. For instance, in the case of
video game learning [6], the attacker is capable of changing the pixel values of
the game’s frames, but not the score. In cyber-physical scenarios, such pertur-
bations can be implemented by strategic rearrangement of objects or precise
illumination of certain areas via tools such as laser pointers. To this end, we
assume that the attacker is capable of changing the state before it is observed
by the target, either by predicting future states, or after such states are gener-
ated by the environment’s dynamics. The latter can be achieved if the attacker
has a faster action speed than the target’s sampling rate, or by inducing a delay
between generation of the new environment and its observation by the target.
To avoid detection and minimize influence on the environment’s dynamics,
we impose an extra constraint on the attack such that the magnitude of pertur-
bations applied in each configuration must be smaller than a set value denoted
by ǫ. Also, we do not limit the attacker’s domain of perturbations (e.g. in the case
of video games, the attacker may change the value of any pixel at any position
on the screen).
4 Attack Mechanism
As discussed in Section 2, the DQN framework of Mnih et. al. [7] can be seen as
consisting of two neural networks, one is the native network which performs the
image classification and function approximation, and the other is the auxiliary
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Qˆ network whose architecture and parameters are copies of the native network
sampled once every c iterations. Training of DQN is performed optimizing the
loss function of equation 4 by Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD). Due to the
similarity of this process and the training mechanism of neural network classi-
fiers, we hypothesize that the function approximators of DQN are also vulnerable
to adversarial example attacks. In other words, the set of all possible inputs to
the approximated functions Q and Qˆ contains elements which cause the approx-
imated functions to generate outputs that are different from the output of the
original Q function. Furthermore, we hypothesize that similar to the case of
classifiers, the elements that cause one DQN to generate incorrect Q values will
incur the same effect on other DQNs that approximate the same Q-function.
Consequently, the attacker can manipulate a DQN’s learning process by craft-
ing states st such that Qˆ(st+1, a; θ
−
t ) identifies an incorrect choice of optimal
action at st+1. If the attacker is capable of crafting adversarial inputs s
′
t and
s′t+1 such that the value of Equation 4 is minimized for a specific action a
′, then
the policy learned by DQN at this time-step is optimized towards suggesting a′
as the optimal action given the state st.
Considering that the attacker is not aware of the target’s network archi-
tecture and its parameters at every time step, crafting adversarial states must
rely on black-box techniques such as those introduced in [18]. Attacker can ex-
ploit the transferability of adversarial examples by obtaining the state pertur-
bations from a replica of the target’s DQN. At every time step of training this
replica, attacker calculates the perturbation vectors δˆt+1 for the next state st+1
such that maxa′Qˆ(st+1 + δˆt+1, a
′; θ−t ) causes Qˆ to generate its maximum when
a′ = π∗adv(st+1), i.e., the maximum reward at the next state is obtained when
the optimal action taken at that state is determined by attacker’s policy.
This is procedurally similar to targeted misclassification attacks described in
Section 2 that aim to find minimal perturbations to an input sample such that
the classifier assigns the maximum value of likelihood to an incorrect target class.
Therefore, the adversarial example crafting techniques developed for classifiers,
such as the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) and the Jacobian Saliency Map
Algorithm (JSMA), can be applied to obtain the perturbation vector δˆt+1.
The procedure of this attack can be divided into the two phases of initializa-
tion and exploitation. The initialization phase implements processes that must
be performed before the target begins interacting with the environment, which
are:
1. Train a DQN based on attacker’s reward function r′ to obtain the adversarial
policy π∗adv
2. Create a replica of the target’s DQN and initialize with random parameters
The exploitation phase implements the attack processes such as crafting ad-
versarial inputs. This phase constitutes an attack cycle depicted in figure 2. The
cycle initiates with the attacker’s first observation of the environment, and runs
in tandem with the target’s operation. Algorithm 1 details the procedural flow
of this phase.
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2. Attacker estimates best action 
according to adversarial policy
Fig. 2: Exploitation cycle of policy induction attack
5 Experimental Verification
To study the performance and efficacy of the proposed mechanism, we examine
the targeting of Mnih et. al.’s DQN designed to learn Atari 2600 games [7]. In
our setup, we train the network on a game of Pong implemented in Python using
the PyGame library [12]. The game is played against an opponent with a modest
level of heuristic artificial intelligence, and is customized to handle the delays in
DQN’s reaction due to the training process. The game’s backened provides the
DQN agent with the game screen sampled at 8Hz, as well as the game score (+1
for win, -1 for lose, 0 for ongoing game) throughout each episode of the game.
The set of available actions A = {UP,DOWN,Stand} enables the DQN agent
to control the movements of its paddle. Figure 3 illustrates the game screen of
Pong used in our experiments.
The training process of DQN is implemented in TensorFlow [20] and executed
on an Amazon EC2 g2.2xlarge instance [21] with 8 Intel Xeon E5-2670 CPU cores
and a NVIDIA GPU with 1536 CUDA cores and 4GB of video memory. Each
state observed by the DQN is a stack of 4 consecutive 80x80 gray-scale game
frames. Similar to the original architecture of Mnih et. al. [7], this input is first
passed through two convolutional layers to extract a compressed feature space
for the following two feed-forward layers for Q function estimation. The discount
factor γ is set to 0.99, and the initial probability of taking a random action is
set to 1, which is annealed after every 500000 actions. The agent is also set to
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Algorithm 1: Exploitation Procedure
input : adversarial policy pi∗
adv
, initialized replica DQNs Q′, Qˆ′, synchronization
frequency c, number of iterations N
1 for observation = 1, N do
2 Observe current state st, action at, reward rt, and resulting state st+1
3 if st+1 is not terminal then
4 set a′
adv
= pi∗
adv
(st+1)
5 Calculate perturbation vector δˆt+1 = Craft(Qˆ′, a′adv , st+1)
6 Update st+1 ← st+1 + δˆt+1
7 Set yt = (rt +maxa′Qˆ′(st+1 + δˆt+1, a
′; θ′
−
)
8 Perform SGD on (yt −Q′(st, at, θ′))2 w.r.t θ′
9 end
10 Reveal st+1 to target
11 if observation mod c = 0 then θ′
−
← θ′
12 end
Fig. 3: Game of Pong
train its DQN after every 50000 observations. Regular training of this DQN takes
approximately 1.5 million iterations (∼16 hours on the g2.2xlarge instance) to
reach a winning average of 51% against the heuristic AI of its opponent1
Following the threat model presented in Section 3, this experiment considers
an attacker capable of observing the states interactions between his target DQN
and the game, but his domain of influence is limited to implementation of minor
changes on the environment. Considering the visual representation of the envi-
ronment in this setup, the minor changes incurred by attacker take the form of
perturbing pixel values in the 4 consecutive frames of a given state.
1 As expected, longer training of this DQN leads to better results. After a 2-week pe-
riod of training we verified the convergent trait of our implementation by witnessing
winning averages of more than 80%.
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5.1 Evaluation of Vulnerability to Adversarial Examples
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Fig. 4: Success rate of crafting adversarial examples for DQN
Successful implementations of the proposed policy induction attack mecha-
nisms rely on the vulnerability of DQNs to targeted adversarial perturbations.
To verify the existence of this vulnerability, the Qˆ networks of target were sam-
pled at regular intervals during training in the game environment. In the next
step, 100 observations comprised of a pair of consecutive states (st, st+1) were
randomly selected from the experience memory of DQN, to ensure the possi-
bility of their occurrence in the game. Considering st+1 to be the variable that
can be manipulated by the attacker, it is passed along with the model Qˆ to the
adversarial example crafting algorithms. To study the extent of vulnerability,
we evaluated the success rate of both FGSM and JSMA algorithms for each of
the 100 random observations in inducing a random game action other than the
current optimal a∗t . The results, presented in Figure 4, verify that DQNs are
indeed vulnerable to adversarial example attacks. It is noteworthy that the suc-
cess rate of FGSM with a fixed perturbation limit decreases by one percent per
100000 observations as the number of observations increases. Yet, JSMA seems
to be more robust to this effect as it maintains a success rate of 100 percent
throughout the experiment.
5.2 Verification of Transferability
To measure the transferability of adversarial examples between models, we trained
another Q-network with a similar architecture on the same experience memory
of the game at the sampled instances of the previous experiment. It is note-
worthy that due to random initializations, the exploration mechanism, and the
stochastic nature of SGD, even similar Q-networks trained on the same set of
observations will obtain different sets of weights. The second Q-network was
tested to measure its vulnerability to the adversarial examples obtained from
the last experiment. Figure 5 shows that more than 70% of the perturbations
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obtained from both FGSM and JSMA methods also affect the second network,
hence verifying the transferability of adversarial examples between DQNs.
1.26 1.28 1.3 1.32 1.34 1.36
No. iterations x 1e6
0
20
40
60
80
100
Tr
a
n
s
fe
r 
S
u
c
c
e
s
s
 R
a
te
 % FGSM
JSMA
Fig. 5: Transferability of adversarial examples in DQN
5.3 Performance of Proposed Policy Induction Attack
Our final experiment tests the performance of our proposed exploitation mech-
anism. In this experiment, we consider an adversary whose reward value is the
exact opposite of the game score, meaning that it aims to devise a policy that
maximizes the number of lost games. To obtain this policy, we trained an adver-
sarial DQN on the game, whose reward value was the negative of the value ob-
tained from target DQN’s reward function. With the adversarial policy at hand,
a target DQN was setup to train on the game environment to maximize the orig-
inal reward function. The game environment was modified to allow perturbation
of pixel values in game frames by the adversary. A second DQN was also setup
to train on the target’s observations to provide an estimation of the target DQN
to enable blackbox crafting of adversarial example. At every observation, the
adversarial policy obtained in the initialization phase was consulted to calculate
the action that would satisfy the adversary’s goal. Then, the JSMA algorithm
was utilized to generate the adversarial example that would cause the output
of the replica DQN network to be the action selected by the adversarial policy.
This example was then passed to the target DQN as its observation. Figure 6
compares the performance of unperturbed and attacked DQNs in terms of their
reward values, measured as the difference of current game score with the aver-
age score. It can be seen that the reward value for the targeted agent rapidly
falls below the unperturbed case and maintains the trend of losing the game
throughout the experiment. This result confirms the efficacy of our proposed
attack mechanism, and verifies the vulnerability of Deep Q-Networks to policy
induction attacks.
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Fig. 6: Comparison of rewards between unperturbed and attacked DQNs
6 Discussion on Current Counter-Measures
Since the introduction of adversarial examples by Szgedey, et. al. [16], various
counter-measures have been proposed to mitigate the exploitation of this vul-
nerability in deep neural networks. Goodfellow et. al. [17] proposed to retrain
deep networks on a set of minimally perturbed adversarial examples to prevent
their misclassification. This approach suffers from two inherent short-comings:
Firstly, it aims to increase the amount of perturbations required to craft an
adversarial example. Second, this approach does not provide a comprehensive
counter-measure as it is computationally inefficient to find all possible adver-
sarial examples. Furthermore, Papernot et. al. [18] argue that by training the
network on adversarial examples, the emerging network will have new adversarial
examples and hence this technique does not solve the problem of exploiting this
vulnerability for critical systems. Consequently, Papernot, et. al [14] proposed
a technique named Defensive Distillation, which is also based on retraining the
network on a dimensionally-reduced set of training data. This approach, too,
was recently shown to be insufficient in mitigating adversarial examples [22].
It is hence concluded that the current state of the art in countering adversar-
ial examples and their exploitation is incapable of providing a concrete defense
against such exploitations.
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In the context of policy induction attacks, we conjecture that the temporal
features of the training process may be utilized to provide protection mecha-
nisms. The proposed attack mechanism relies on the assumption that due to the
decreasing chance of random actions, the target DQN is most likely to perform
the action induced by adversarial inputs as the number of iterations progress.
This may be mitigated by implementing adaptive exploration-exploitation mech-
anisms that both increase and decrease the chance of random actions according
to the performance of the trained model. Also, it may be possible to exploit
spatio-temporal pattern recognition techniques to detect and omit regular per-
turbations during the pre-processing phase of the learning process. Investigating
such techniques is the priority of our future work.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
We established the vulnerability of reinforcement learning based on Deep Q-
Networks to policy induction attacks. Furthermore, we proposed an attack mech-
anism which exploits the vulnerability of deep neural networks to adversarial
examples, and demonstrated its efficacy and impact through experiments on a
game-learning DQN.
This preliminary work solicitates a wide-range of studies on the security of
Deep Reinforcement Learning. As discussed in Section 6, novel countermeasures
need to be investigated to mitigate the effect of such attacks on DQNs deployed in
cyber-physical and critical systems. Also, an analytical treatment of the problem
to establish the bounds and relationships of model parameters, such as network
architecture and exploration mechanisms, with DQN’s vulnerability to policy
induction will provide deeper insight and guidelines into designing safe and secure
deep reinforcement learning architectures.
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